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Abstract: Online feedback mechanism, best known right
now for building trust and reputation in electronic markets,
are regarded as a major player in the success of many online
trading communities. It can reduce sellers’ anonymities,
mitigate the buyers’ risks, and affect the price premiums.
In this paper, we investigate the relationship between
feedback mechanisms and price premiums by the analysis of
field data. An intelligent agent is build to collect actual
data from Yahoo Auction. The research results will also
allow us to better understand whether positive/negative
rating has different effects. It may also clarify mediating
effects of product characteristics on the relationship between
reputation systems and price premiums.
Keywords: Feedback Mechanisms, Reputation, Online
Auction, Trust.

I. Introduction
In the past several years market exchanges have been done
in ways that were not possible before. This is due to the
development of technology online business activities rapid
increase. People can now perform commercial activities
without meeting their trading partners (Xu & Yadav, 2003).
Online auctions, as a new form of E-Commerce, provide
new opportunities for people to exchange products
efficiently and conveniently. According to the report of
Yahoo Auction in Taiwan, transaction amount reached 10
billion NT dollars in 2003. Many sellers have even started to
consider online action transactions as full-time jobs; thus
raising the importance of understanding factors that impact
online auctions.
Nevertheless, online trading is regarded as risky because
trading parties may never have met. Traders have little
knowledge about the identities of their trading partners and
the real conditions and qualities of products (Xu & Yadav,
2003). According to the report announced by Internet Fraud
Watch in February 2005, online auction is counted for 51%
to rank first in consumers’ complaints in 2004, which is
about 765 dollars that each consumer loses. Here trust
becomes an important issue in the online transaction
environment, especially in the online auction market. It is
essential for both buyers and sellers to identify the others’
trustworthiness.
Online feedback mechanism, best known today as a
mechanism for building trust and reputation in electronic
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markets, are regarded as a crucial role in the success of
many online trading communities. They are large scale
online word-of-mouth communities in which individuals
share opinions on a wide range of topics, including products,
services, and companies (Dellarocas, 2003). The feedback
mechanisms can reduce the sellers’ anonymity and mitigate
the buyers’ risks (Gefen et al., 2003). While one would
expect the feedback mechanisms to benefit only the buyers,
the sellers benefit as well. Strader and Ramaswami (2002)
investigated the level of importance of factors affecting
online buyers’ decision making process. Their research
result shows that trust, using feedback profiles as a proxy,
significantly affects price premiums, which decreases as the
transaction value increases. Ba and Pavlou (2002) also
indicate that higher positive rating increases the trust of
buyers and makes price premiums.
That being the case, however; it is important to note that
these studies primarily depend on surveys of individuals’
perceptions or observations of subjects in a controlled
experimental setting. They do not account the effects of
online feedback mechanisms from an actual behavior
perspective. In this paper, we investigate the relationship
between feedback mechanisms and price premiums by the
analysis of field data. An actual behavior data illustrates
the relationship between feedback mechanisms and price
premiums. The research results will also allow us to have a
better understanding of whether or not positive/negative
rating has different effect. It may also clarify mediating
effect of product characteristics on the relationship between
reputation systems and price premiums.

II. Conceptual Model
Figure 1 presents the research framework for the study.
Feedback profiles with both positive and negative rating
affect price premiums.
It is moderated by product
characteristics.

Figure 1. Research Framework
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Trust
Following Ba and Pavlou (2002), trust is defined as the
subjective assessment of one party that another party will
perform a particular transaction according to his or her
confident expectations, in an environment characterized by
uncertainty. There are three sources of trust that can be
distinguished in E-Commerce (Gefen et al., 2003):
calculative-based trust, institutional trust, and familiarity.
Familiarity through repeated interaction are not possible in
most online transactions (Xu & Yadav, 2003); because
institutional structures in the online world are not yet welldeveloped (Fung & Lee, 1999). The most prevalent source
of trust in non-repeated transaction environment is probably
calculative-based trust, which means that it is not
worthwhile for the opposite party to engage in opportunistic
behaviors (Doney et al., 1998).
Trust is an essential component of online transaction
behaviors.
It reduces perceived risk and increases
willingness to buy (Xu & Yadav, 2003). Pavlou and Gefen
(2004) indicate that trust in the community of sellers has
positive effect on transaction intentions, but significant
negative effect on perceived risk of the seller community.
Because buyers realize the effect of perceived risk, they are
willing to compensate reputable sellers with price premiums
in order to assure safe transactions. According to the
definition of Ba and Pavlou (2002), price premium is the
monetary amount above the average price received by
multiple sellers for a certain matching product. They also
find that trust of sellers has a positive effect on price
premiums.
Feedback Mechanisms
Feedback mechanisms are used widely in online auction
markets. They provide a place where users are able to
leave comments about their buying and selling experiences
and their evaluations of the buyers and sellers whom they
perform the transaction with (Ba & Pavlou, 2002). They
rank as positive ratings, neutral ratings, and negative ratings.
Each rating equals a paired buyer-seller transaction. This
mechanism allows buyers and sellers to rate each other
following transactions and makes the history of a trader’s
past ratings public to the entire community (Dellarocas,
2003).
Feedback mechanisms can be viewed as a
reputation system or word-of-mouth network. It also
encourages traders to behave well if they want long-run
plays.
Prior researches have also shown that feedback
mechanisms affect trust in Community of sellers (Pavlou &
Gefen, 2004), and that trust in sellers has positive effects on
price premiums (Ba & Pavlou, 2002).
Strader and
Ramaswami (2002) also indicated reputation of the seller as
the most important factor in trust that affects online sellers’
choices. Although we can’t directly measure the effects of
trust in the field data experiment of this research, prior study
have suggested feedback mechanism as a proxy of trust.
According to these researches, we can assume the effects of
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feedback profiles and form the following hypothesis:
H1: Sellers with better feedback gain higher price
premiums compared to sellers with worse feedback.
Product Characteristics
There are a big number of product items that are
investigated by online auction researches. Resnick et al.
(2002) summarizes 14 previous studies of product items, as
shown in Table 1. Strader and Ramaswami (2002) chose
baseball cards as their product sample. This does not,
however, answer the question of whether or not different
products result in different outcomes of research. Ba and
Pavlou (2002) investigated the moderate effects of product
price. They found that the relationship between trust and
price premium is stronger in expensive products. It is
unknown if there exist any other characteristics of product
affect trust and price premiums. For example, previous
researches focus on the search goods rather than experienced
goods. By categorizing the product we realize there might
be different in price premiums.
There are many ways to categorize the product. Nelson
(1974) defined two types of goods:
z A good is a “search good” when full information for
dominant product attributes can be known prior to
purchase.
z A good is an “experience good” when either condition
holds:
1. Full information on “dominant” attributes cannot
be known without direct experience.
2. Information search for “dominant” attributes is
more costly/difficult than direct product experience.
Table 1. Summary of previous researches (Resnick et al., 2002)
Citation
Item sold
Ba and Pavlou (2002)
Music, software, electronics
Bajari and Hortacsu (2003)
Coins
Dewan and Hsu (2002)
Stamps
Eaton (2002)
Electric guitars
Houser and Wooders (2000)
Pentium chips
Kalyanam and McIntyre (2001)
Palm Pilot PDAs
Kauffman and Wood (2000)
Coins
Lee et al. (2000)
Computer monitors and printers
Livinston (2002)
Golf clubs
Lucking-Reiley et al. (2000)
Coins
Melnik and Alm (2002)
Gold coins
McDonald and Slawson (2002)
Dolls
Resnick and Zeckhauser (2002)
MP3 players, Beanie babies
Resnick et al. (2002)
Vintage postcards

Figueiredo (2000) argued that the ability to judge the
quality of a product is the biggest differentiator among
product categories on the Web. He classified the product
into four categories: commodity products, quasi-commodity
products, “look and feel” goods, and “look and feel” goods
with variable quality; however, look and feel goods with
variable, like original art or used cars, is difficult to use to
analyze the effect in online auction environments. We
choose two types of goods as our product categories and
investigate whether or not there are different outcomes
between search goods and experienced goods.
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H2: The relationship between trust and price
premium is moderated by product characteristics.

III.

Proposed Research Methodology

This study builds an intelligent agent to collect actual
behavior data from Yahoo Auction. We choose Yahoo
Auction as our sample due to that it is 16 times larger than
the Taiwan eBay auction market.
Figure 2 illustrates the architecture of the agent system.
We implemented the intelligent agent with Asp.net and
Microsoft SQL Server 2000. As depicted in figure 2, the
agent can respond for parsing required data gathered from
the web page of Yahoo Auction website and then filter and
store it in database for future analysis. We will employ
multiple regression analysis to examine the relationship
between feedback mechanisms and price premiums.
Independent variables are the logarithm of the number of
positive and negative ratings, and the dependent variable is
the price premium developed by subtracting the mean price
from the final price of each product divided by its mean
price. It is expressed in equation (1).
Price Premiums = β0 + β1 • Log(PositiveRating) + β2 •
Log(NegativeRating) + ε (1)

Figure 2. The System Architecture of Intelligent Agent

IV.

Current State of Research

At present, the field data of Yahoo Auction bidders’
behaviors is being collected. We will employ linear
procedures in SPSS to approximate all parameters. By the
time of the conference, we expect that the relationship
between feedback mechanisms and price premiums will be
fully explored. The fitness of equation and mediating effects
of product characteristics will also be presented at the same
time.
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